TWELVE TOWARD A WORLD REPUBLIC

Countermovements against Capital

When we reflect on the characteristics of the state and industrial capital, we see that struggles against capitalism until now have been characterized by major weaknesses. First, they attempted to counter capital by means of the state. This is certainly possible, but it results in excessive state power. Moreover, in order to maintain the state, it eventually becomes necessary to summon capitalism back up again. This was the fate of the socialist revolutions of the twentieth century. We need to remain vigilant in our awareness that the state is an autonomous entity. If the abolition of capitalism is not at the same time an abolition of the state, it will be meaningless.

Another weakness came from socialist movements basing themselves in worker struggles at the site of production. Looking at nineteenth-century socialist movements, we see that they initially placed great importance on the process of circulation—as with, for example, Robert Owen and P.-J. Proudhon. They thought that workers should resist capital by creating their own forms of currency and credit, finally abolishing wage labor through associations (producer cooperatives) of laborers. But at this time there were still many independent, small-scale producers in which workers retained the characteristics of artisans. As the reorganization of labor by industrial capital got under way, Marx pointed out that such movements were unable to counter capitalism because of these fatal limitations. With the exception of Britain, however, industrial

capitalism remained undeveloped, and Proudhonist movements were predominant.

It is also true that as industrial capitalism developed, socialist movements came to base themselves in the site of production—that is, in the struggles of organized labor. The turning point came with the 1871 Paris Commune. For example, after this anarchists faded from the scene, with some of them turning to terrorism, but they subsequently came back with a new focus. They now preached a syndicalism based in labor unions, one that sought to realize the socialist revolution through the general strike. In the socialist movements that arose after the Paris Commune, the Marxists were not alone in giving priority to struggle at the site of production

At the same time, struggle at the site of production met with its own particular difficulties. In situations characterized by undeveloped industrial capital and an absence of labor unions, conflict between capital and labor takes a violent form: class conflict here is not simply economic; it is also political. These struggles ultimately result, however, in the legalization and expansion of labor unions, as the struggles between labor and management take on a purely economic character and become in effect one link in the labor market. As a result, any possibility for a revolutionary movement that would seek to abolish wage labor disappears. This tendency becomes more pronounced as industrial capitalism develops and deepens. This makes it increasingly impossible to hope for a working-class revolutionary movement in the advanced capitalist countries.

In this situation, as Vladimir Lenin would assert, the working class is closed off in a kind of natural consciousness, necessitating an external intervention by a Marxist vanguard party in order to get it to rise up in class struggle. Georg Lukács rephrased this idea in the vocabulary of philosophy. He asserted that the working class had fallen prey to a reified consciousness and therefore a vanguard party of intellectuals was needed to awaken them to class consciousness and political struggle.[1] The trouble is, the more industrial capitalism develops, the more difficult this becomes.

During the initial stages of industrial capitalism, capital exploited laborers under brutal working conditions, and workers truly were wage slaves. The struggles of workers against capital at this stage resembled slave and serf revolts. But the relationship between capital and wage labor is qualitatively different from that between master and slave or lord and serf. Industrial capitalism resembles the latter only at the stage where mode of exchange C (commodity exchange) has yet to completely penetrate and reorganize the social formation. At this stage, wage labor is hard to distinguish from semi-

feudal or slave labor. This situation can still be found today on the peripheral underside of global capitalism, where political struggles still resemble classical class conflict or slave revolts. But we should not look to such places to find the essence of industrial capitalism; moreover, toppling the social order in them will not lead to the superseding of capitalism.

Industrial capital is a system for obtaining surplus value entirely through the principles of commodity exchange. Older concepts of class struggle are utterly ineffective against it. This does not mean, however, that class struggle has ended: so long as the conflicts arising from the relations between capital and wage labor are not abolished, class struggle will continue. The ineffectiveness of the old concept of class struggle comes from its being centered on the process of production. In other words, it comes from the lack of a perspective capable of seeing the definitive features of industrial capital in the totality of its processes of accumulation.

In a capitalist society, commodity mode of exchange C is dominant, yet this comes in varying degrees. For example, in the initial stages, industrial production develops but traditional communal ways of life persist in rural areas. As industrial capitalism advances, mode of exchange C gradually permeates into areas previously under the domain of the family, community, or state. But this process always remains incomplete: even in the heart of capitalist enterprises, for example, we find the persistence of strong traces of communal elements—of mode of exchange A.

As industrial capital develops, however, mode of exchange C penetrates deeply into all domains. In the stage of so-called neoliberalism that has arisen since 1990, we see this to a particularly dramatic degree. We see the increasing penetration of capitalism not only in the former socialist bloc or developing countries but also within the advanced capitalist nations. There we see the intensified penetration of capitalism into fields that were previously relatively impervious to the capitalist economy, such as social welfare, medicine, and universities. Mode of exchange C now permeates not only the processes of production but also the very basis of human (labor-power) reproduction. What kind of resistance to capital is possible in this situation? None—if we limit ourselves to the production process. But resistance is not impossible from a perspective that grasps the process of accumulation of capital as a totality.

Let us consider once more the process of accumulation of capital. In general, capital is often equated with money, but in Marx's view, capital signifies the totality of processes of transformation that can be expressed as M-C-M′. For example, the physical plant of production constitutes invariable capital,

while contract workers constitute variable capital. These transformations are the means by which capital achieves self-valorization. Workers are just as subject to transformation as is capital: they are transformed as their position vis-à-vis capital changes. The encounter between laborer and capitalist unfolds in three phases: first, workers sell their labor as a commodity to the capitalist; second, they engage in the labor contracted for; and, third, workers take up the role of consumers and buy back the goods that they have produced.

In the first phase, the employment contract is based on mutual consent. Its conditions are fundamentally determined by the labor market and involve no extraeconomic compulsion. For this reason, a wage laborer is unlike a slave or serf. But in the second phase, workers are subject to the dictates of capital: they have to carry out the terms of the employment contract. To see the working class in terms of the site of production is to focus on this second phase. Here the wage laborer clearly resembles a slave. Hence, Ricardian socialists called the wage laborer a wage slave.

In this second phase, it is still possible for workers to resist capital, and in fact they have often done so, demanding higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions. In such cases, however, the relation between capital and workers has simply returned to the first phase: this represents nothing more than an improvement in the terms of the employment contract. For this reason, the labor-union movement, which initially resembles a slave revolt, is quickly accepted by the capitalist and transformed into a regular part of the system. Capital does more than accept labor unions; it actually requires them: the labor market takes shape from the results of labor-union struggles.

But even after labor unions are made a regular part of the system, workers in the second phase are still forced to carry out the terms of their contract with capital: they still have to obey the dictates of capital. Up until now, Marxists have placed their hopes for worker uprisings in this second phase. Previously, labor unions engaging in struggle within this phase have at times appeared to be revolutionary. This is sometimes true even now, depending on location. But in so far as these unions legally constitute a regular part of the existing system, their struggles at the site of production will always return to the question of improving the terms of the employment contract. In other words, they will not go beyond being economic struggles. As a result, Marxists such as Lukács came to the conclusion that it was necessary find some other way to get workers to engage in *political* struggle at the site of production.

Once the labor movement is legalized, however, it becomes almost impossible for the working classes to engage in struggle that is both universal and political at the site of production. To begin with, if they do so, they risk being fired. Moreover, at the site of production, workers are apt to adopt the same position as capital. Each capitalist exists in competition with other capitalists and with overseas capital as well. If an enterprise loses out in that competition, it goes bankrupt and its workers lose their jobs. Accordingly, at the site of production, workers to a certain extent share the interests of management. For this reason, we can hardly expect them to engage in a universal class struggle that transcends particular interests. Faced with this, Marxists take up the task of awakening workers from their "reified consciousness" so that they will embrace true class consciousness. But in the developed countries, this proves ineffective. Marxists' focus then turns either to the capitalist periphery, where the labor movement remains a vital force within the site of production, or to political struggles outside the labor movement proper, such as those involving gender or minority issues. This in turn gives rise to a tendency to undervalue the struggles of the working classes themselves.

When we consider the working class, however, we should focus on the third phase. The process of accumulation for industrial capital differs from that of other forms of wealth in its system of not only hiring laborers to work but also making them buy back the products of their own labor. The decisive difference between laborers and slaves or serfs lies in this third phase rather than in the first. A slave produces but never takes up the position of consumer. A serf likewise is self-sufficient and hence completely unrelated to industrial capital.

The working classes have generally been thought of only in terms of poverty. As a result, when their activity as consumers became impossible to ignore, people began to speak of a "consumer society" or "mass society," as if some fundamental change were taking place. But in reality, the proletariat of industrial capital originally appeared in the form of new consumers. In other words, it was only when workers simultaneously functioned as consumers buying back the products of their own labor that industrial capitalism was able to achieve autonomy as a self-reproducing system. If we consider only the second phase, the struggle between capital and the working class will appear analogous to the struggle between slaves and their masters. But in the third phase, a new and previously unknown form of struggle becomes possible.

Let me reiterate the words of Marx I previously quoted: "It is precisely this which distinguishes capital from the [feudal] relationship of

domination—that the *worker* confronts the capitalist as consumer and one who posits exchange value, in the form of a *possessor of money*, of money, of a simple centre of circulation—that he becomes one of the innumerable centres of circulation, in which his specific character as worker is extinguished."[2] By now it should be clear that this means that while workers may be subjected to a kind of servitude within production processes, as consumers they occupy a different position. Within the processes of circulation, it is capital that finds itself placed in a relation of servitude to worker-consumers. If workers decide to resist capital, they should do so not from the site where this is difficult, but rather from the site where they enjoy a dominant position vis-à-vis capital.

Within the site of production, workers share the same consciousness as managers, making it difficult for them to see beyond that particular interest. For example, if an enterprise engages in practices that are socially harmful, we cannot expect its workers to take the lead in protesting against it. Within the site of production, it is difficult for workers to adopt a universal point of view. By contrast, when they occupy the positions of consumer and local resident, people are more sensitive to, for example, environmental problems and hence more likely to see things from a cosmopolitan perspective. In sum, the third phase offers the best opportunity for the working classes to acquire a universal class consciousness.

This understanding of industrial capitalism should lead us to rethink countermovements against capitalism. For example, many people say that the core of social movements has passed from workers to consumers and citizens. Yet with the exception of those few people who make their living from unearned income (rentiers), every consumer and citizen is also a wage laborer in some form or another. Consumers are simply members of the proletariat who have stepped into the site of circulation. This means that consumer movements are also proletariat movements and should be conducted as such. We should not regard citizen movements or those involving gender or minority issues as being separate from working-class movements.

Within the site of production, capital is able to control the proletariat and even compel its members into active cooperation. This makes resistance there extremely difficult. Previous revolutionary movements have called for political strikes by the proletariat, but these have always failed. Within the process of circulation, however, capital is unable to control the proletariat: capital has the power to force people to work, but not to make them buy. The primary form of struggle by the proletariat in the circulation

process is the boycott. Capital has no effective means for countering this nonviolent, legal form of struggle.

Because Marx criticized Proudhon, Marxists have tended to belittle resistance movements based within the processes of circulation. Yet this is precisely where the working class is best able to actively resist capital as a free subject. There it is able to adopt a universal perspective, to see and criticize the various excesses committed by capital in its pursuit of profits and demand a halt to them. Moreover, this is also where possibilities exist for creating a noncapitalist economy—concretely speaking, through consumer-producer cooperatives and local currencies and credit systems.

Since Marx pointed out their shortcomings, producer cooperatives and local-currency schemes—that is movements to transcend the capitalist social formation from within—have rarely been taken seriously. Yet even if they are unable to immediately transcend capitalism, the creation of an economic sphere beyond capitalism is crucial. It gives people a foreshadowing of what it might mean to transcend capitalism.

I have already noted that if the primary means of resistance to capital in the production process is the strike, then its equivalent in the circulation process is the boycott. There are, in fact, two kinds of boycotts. In the first, one refuses to buy, while in the second, one refuses to sell the labor commodity. But in order for these to succeed, the necessary conditions must be created—that is, a noncapitalist economic sphere must be created.

When capital can no longer pursue self-valorization, it stops being capital. Accordingly, sooner or later we will reach the point where rates of profit go into general decline, and when that happens, capitalism will come to an end. This will lead at first to a general social crisis. At that time, however, the existence of a broad, well-established noncapitalist economy will aid in the absorption of this blow and help us move beyond capitalism.

The emphasis on production to the neglect of circulation has undercut movements attempting to counter the processes of capital accumulation. To correct this, we need at a very fundamental level to rethink the history of social formations from the perspective not of modes of production but rather modes of exchange.

Countermovements against the State

The capitalist economy is primarily formed through overseas trade, just as the economy of any given country exists within a world-economy. For this reason, the socialist revolution cannot succeed if it is limited to a single

country. If by chance the revolution should occur in one country, it would immediately encounter interference and sanctions from other countries. Any socialism that did not elicit this sort of interference would be closer to welfare-state capitalism than to actual socialism: it would present no threat to either state or capital. On the other hand, a socialist revolution that really aimed to abolish capital and state would inevitably face interference and sanctions. A successful revolution that wants to preserve itself has only one option: to transform itself into a powerful state. In other words, it is impossible to abolish the state from within a single country.

The state can only be abolished from within, and yet at the same time it cannot be abolished from within. Marx was not troubled by this antinomy, because it was self-evident to him that the socialist revolution was "only possible as the act of the dominant peoples 'all at once' and simultaneously."[3] The 1848 "world revolution" had shown this. Mikhail Bakunin held the same view: "An isolated workers' association, local or national, even in one of the greatest European nations, can never triumph, and . . . victory can only be achieved by a union of all the national and international associations into a single universal association."[4]

How then will the next simultaneous world revolution be possible? It is not something that will simply break out one day, simultaneously in all parts of the world, without our having to do anything. Without an alliance among revolutionary movements around the world established beforehand, simultaneous world revolution is impossible. This is why Marx and Bakunin, among others, organized the First International in 1863: it was supposed to provide the foundation for a simultaneous world revolution.

It is difficult, however, to unite movements from various countries whose industrial capitalism and modern state exist at different stages of development. The First International included a mixture of activists, some from regions where the immediate goal was socialism, and others from places such as Italy, where the primary task was national unification. Moreover, the First International included a split between the Marx and Bakunin factions, one that went beyond a simple opposition between authoritarianism and anarchism, because behind the split lurked the different social realities faced by the various countries.

For example, workers from Switzerland were anarchists and supported Bakunin. These were, however, mostly watchmakers, artisans whose position derived in part from the pressure they felt from mechanized high-volume production in Germany and the United States. In Germany, on the other hand, industrial workers favored organizational movements, which

were anathema to anarchists. For these reasons, the split between the Marx and Bakunin factions was linked to nationalist conflicts. Bakunin, for example, accused Marx of being a Pan-Germanist Prussian spy, while Marx responded by linking Bakunin to the Pan-Slavism of the Russian Empire. This split between the Marx and Bakunin factions led to the dissolution of the First International in 1876. But this should not be understood as simply a result of a split between Marxism and anarchism.

The Second International, established in 1889, primarily comprised German Marxists. But it too was undermined by enormous differences among the various countries and increasingly bitter internal conflicts based on nationalism. As a result, when the First World War broke out in 1914, the socialist parties in each country switched over to supporting national participation in the war. This demonstrates that even when socialist movements from various nations are united in an association, as soon as the state actually launches into war, the movements are unable to resist the pressures of nationalism. Benito Mussolini, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party, for example, turned to fascism at this time.

In February 1917, in the midst of the First World War, the Russian Revolution broke out. After it, a dual power system was set up including a parliament and worker-farmer councils (soviets). The Bolsheviks were a minority faction on both levels. In October Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky brushed aside the opposition of the Bolshevik party leadership to shut down parliament through a military coup d'état and gradually monopolize power by excluding opposing factions from the soviets as well. At this point, Lenin and Trotsky are said to have anticipated a world revolution, starting with a revolution in Germany. But this was an unlikely prospect.

The failure of a German revolution to follow in succession after Russia was entirely predictable: the forceful implementation of the October Revolution radically intensified the vigilance and resistance toward socialist revolution in other countries, above all Germany. Moreover, the October Revolution was—for example, in the aid given to help Lenin return home from exile—in important ways supported by the German state, which hoped for a revolution that would cause the Russian Empire to drop out of the war. The October Revolution actually aided German imperialism and set back the possibility of a socialist revolution. Under such conditions, it was foolish to hope for a simultaneous world revolution.

With the intention of fostering world revolution, Lenin and Trotsky established the Third International (Comintern) in 1919. But this bore only a superficial resemblance to simultaneous world revolution. In the previous

Internationals, despite differences in relative influence due to differences in the scale of their movements and in their theoretical positions, the revolutionary movements of various countries met as equals. But in the Third International, as the only member to have seized state power, the Soviet Communist Party enjoyed a position of overwhelming dominance. The movements from other countries followed the directives of the Soviet Communist Party and lent their support to the Soviet state. As a result, the international communist movement acquired a degree of real power hitherto unseen. This was because Soviet support made it possible for socialist revolutions around the world to avoid direct interference from the capitalist powers. But this also meant that those revolutionary movements were subordinated to the Soviet Union, subsumed into its world-empire-like system.

But the Idea of a simultaneous world revolution did not end there. For example, Trotsky launched the Fourth International in an attempt to organize a movement that was both anticapitalist and anti-Stalinist. But this was never able to achieve effectiveness. Subsequently, Mao Zedong can be said to have proposed a simultaneous revolution of the Third World against the so-called First World (capitalism) and Second World (Soviet bloc). This too, however, was short-lived. In 1990 the Soviet bloc—in other words, the Second World—collapsed, and this meant also the collapse of the Third World. Its sense of a shared identity was lost, and it fragmented into a number of supranational states (empires): the Islamic world, China, India, and so forth.

Did the vision of a simultaneous world revolution disappear with this? Certainly not. In a sense, 1968 was a simultaneous world revolution. It arose unexpectedly and, seen from the perspective of political power, ended in failure, yet seen from the perspective of what Immanuel Wallerstein calls "antisystemic movements," 1968 had a tremendous impact.[5] On this point, it resembles the revolution of 1848. In fact, 1968 was in many ways a reawakening of the outcome of the 1848 European revolution. For example, 1968 saw the rehabilitation of the early Marx, Proudhon, Max Stirner, and Charles Fourier. What was the fate of the vision of simultaneous world revolution after this? Since 1990 it has served as a summons to reawaken the world revolution of 1968—really, of 1848—as seen, for example, in Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's notion of a simultaneous worldwide revolt by the "multitude"—a multitude that is equivalent to the proletariat of 1848.[6] To wit, the people who were called the proletariat in the 1848 uprisings

shouldn't be thought of as industrial workers: they were in fact the multitude.

In that sense, the notion of a simultaneous world revolution still persists today. But it is never clearly analyzed, which is precisely why it functions as a myth. If we want to avoid repeating the failures of the past, we need to subject the notion to a detailed analysis. To reiterate, simultaneous world revolution is sought by movements that seek to abolish the state from within. But the movements in different countries are characterized by large disparities in terms of their interests and goals. In particular, the deep fissure between global North and South lingers—now taking on the guise of a religious conflict. A transnational movement will always fall prey to internal splits arising due to conflicts between states, no matter how closely its members band together. The emergence of a socialist government in one or more countries may make it possible to avoid this kind of schism, but would only lead to a different kind of schism—that between movements that hold state power and those that don't. For this reason, any attempt to build a global union of countermovements that arise within separate countries is destined to end in failure.

Kant's "Perpetual Peace"

When we think about simultaneous world revolution, Immanuel Kant is our best resource. Of course, Kant was not thinking in terms of a socialist revolution: what he had in mind was a Rousseauian bourgeois revolution. He also realized the difficulties inherent in it. If a bourgeois revolution aims not just at political liberty but also economic equality, it will invite interference not only from within its own country but from surrounding absolutist monarchies. Accordingly, the bourgeois revolution could not be a revolution confined to a single country. Kant writes:

> *The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is dependent upon the problem of a law-governed* ***external relation between states*** *and cannot be solved without having first solved the latter.* What good does it do to work on establishing a law-governed civil constitution among individuals, that is, to organize a *commonwealth*? The same unsociability that had compelled human beings to pursue this commonwealth also is the reason that every commonwealth, in its external relations, that is, as a state among states, exists in unrestricted freedom and consequently that

> states must expect the same ills from other states that threatened individuals and compelled them to enter into a law-governed civil condition.[7]

"A perfect civil constitution" here refers to the state as an association formed through a Rousseauian social contract. Such a civil constitution's establishment depends on relations with other states—specifically, with surrounding absolutist monarchies. Without somehow preventing armed intervention by other states, a bourgeois revolution in a single state is impossible. For this reason, Kant added that such states must reach the point "where, on the one hand internally, through an optimal organization of the civil constitution, and on the other hand externally, through a common agreement and legislation, a condition is established that, similar to a civil commonwealth, can maintain itself *automatically*."[8] In sum, the idea of a federation of nations was originally conceived precisely for the sake of realizing a true bourgeois revolution.

In fact, the French Revolution produced a civil constitution, but it was immediately subjected to interference and obstruction at the hands of the surrounding absolute monarchies. This led to a distortion of the democratic revolution. Maximilien de Robespierre's Reign of Terror was in large measure amplified by this terror from outside. In 1792 the Legislative Assembly launched a war to defend the revolution. But at the same moment, the state as association was transformed into an authoritarian state. As a result, the distinction between the war to defend the revolution and the war to export the revolution became hazy—which is to say, it became difficult to distinguish the war to export the revolution from a conventional war of conquest. Kant published his "Toward a Perpetual Peace" in the period when Napoleon Bonaparte had begun to make a name for himself in the wars to defend the revolution. After this, the world war now known as the Napoleonic Wars broke out across Europe.

But if we look again at the passages I quoted, it is clear that Kant had already to a certain extent anticipated this situation. The frustration of the bourgeois revolution in a single country resulted in world war. It was at this point that Kant published "Toward a Perpetual Peace." Consequently, Kant's notion of a federation of nations has been read somewhat simplistically as a proposal for the sake of peace—it has been read, that is, primarily within the lineage of pacifism that begins from Saint-Pierre's "perpetual peace." But Kant's perpetual peace does not simply mean peace as the absence of war; it means peace as "the end to all hostilities."[9] This can only

mean that the state no longer exists; in other words, perpetual peace signifies the abolition of the state. This is clear when we look back at the proposal Kant made prior to the French Revolution for a federation of nations for the sake of the coming bourgeois revolution.

Kant's refusal to admit the possibility of revolution in a single country was not only due to the way that revolution invited interference from other countries. Kant from the start gave the name "Kingdom of Ends" to the society that had realized the moral law of always treating others not solely as means but also always as ends. This necessarily refers to a situation in which capitalism has been abolished. Yet this Kingdom of Ends could never exist within a single country. Even if one country should manage to realize a perfect civil constitution within, it would still be based on treating other countries solely as means (i.e., exploitation) and therefore could not qualify as the Kingdom of Ends. The Kingdom of Ends cannot be thought of in terms of a single country; it can only be realized as a "World Republic." Kant argues that the World Republic was the Idea toward which human history should strive: *"A philosophical attempt to describe the universal history of the world according to a plan of nature that aims at the perfect civil union of the human species must be considered to be possible and even to promote this intention of nature."*[10]

Kant's "Toward a Perpetual Peace" has generally been regarded as proposing a practical plan for realizing this Idea of a World Republic. In that sense, some have said that the text represents Kant taking a step back from the ideal and making a compromise with reality. For example, Kant writes:

> As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can be no other way for them to emerge from the lawless condition, which contains only war, than for them to relinquish, just as do individual human beings, their wild (lawless) freedom, to accustom themselves to public binding laws, and to thereby form a *state of peoples* (*civitas gentium*), which, continually expanding, would ultimately comprise all of the peoples of the world. But since they do not, according to their conception of international right, want the positive idea of a *world republic* at all (thus rejecting *in hypothesi* what is right *in thesi*), only the *negative* surrogate of a lasting and continually expanding *federation* that prevents war can curb the inclination to hostility and defiance of the law, though there is the constant threat of its breaking loose again.[11]

But Kant called for a federation of nations not simply because it was a realistic, "negative surrogate." From the start, he believed that the road to a World

Republic lay not with a "*state of peoples*" but rather with a federation of nations. Here we find something fundamentally different from Thomas Hobbes and from the line of thought that developed from him. Kant, of course, begins from the same premise as Hobbes, namely the "state of nature": "The state of nature (*status naturalis*) is not a state of peace among human beings who live next to one another but a state of war, that is, if not always an outbreak of hostilities, then at least the constant threat of such hostilities. Hence the state of peace must be *established*."[12] Kant differs from Hobbes in how he proposes to establish this state of peace.

For Hobbes, the existence of the sovereign (i.e., the state) who monopolizes violence signifies the establishment of the state of peace. In the relations between states, however, a state of nature continues. The existence of the state was in itself sufficient, and Hobbes never considered its abolition. If, however, we attempt in the same manner to overcome the state of nature existing between states, it is self-evident that we would need to propose a new sovereign, a world state. What Kant calls "a state of peoples" refers to this. But Kant opposed this. It could certainly lead to peace as the absence of war, but it could never lead to *perpetual peace*. For Kant, a state of peace could only be established through the abolition of the state. A state of peoples or a world state, after all, would still be a state.

Kant and Hegel

We need to think about how it might be possible to create a federation of nations, one without a world state (empire) acting as ultimate sovereign, that would obey international law or the "Law of Peoples."[13] From a Hobbesian perspective, this is impossible: just as was the case domestically, a state of peace becomes possible only when the various countries enter into a social contract under a sovereign who monopolizes power. Without this, a federation of nations would lack the means to punish violations of international law. G. W. F. Hegel also took this view, criticizing Kant on this point:

> Kant's idea was that eternal peace should be secured by an alliance of states. This alliance should settle every dispute, make impossible the resort to arms for a decision, and be recognized by every state. This idea assumes that states are in accord, an agreement which, strengthened though it might be by moral, religious, and other considerations, nevertheless always rested on the private sovereign will, and was therefore liable to be disturbed by the element of contingency.[14]

In Hegel's view, the functioning of international law requires a state with the power to punish countries that commit violations, meaning that there cannot be peace in the absence of a hegemonic state. Moreover, Hegel does not see war itself as something automatically to be rejected. In his view, world history is a courtroom in which states pursue disputes with one another. The world-historical idea is realized through this process. As we see with Napoleon, for example, the world-historical idea is realized through the will to power of a single sovereign or state. This is what Hegel called the "cunning of reason."[15]

But Kant's idealism did not, as Hegel claimed, arise from a naive point of view. Albeit in a different sense from Hegel, Kant held the same view as Hobbes: the essence of humanity (human nature) lay in unsociable sociability, which Kant believed could not be eliminated. Common wisdom pits Kant in contrast to Hobbes on this point, but this is a shallow understanding. Kant's proposal for a federation of nations as the basis for perpetual peace arose from his clear recognition of the difficulty of doing away with the fundamentally violent nature of the state. He did not think that this meant we should abandon the regulative idea of a world republic, but rather that we should try to approach it gradually. The federation of nations was to be the first step in this process.

Additionally, while Kant proposed a federation of states, he never believed that this would be realized through human reason or morality. Instead he believed that a federation of states would be brought about by human unsociable sociability—that is, by war. In contrast to Hegel's cunning of reason, this is sometimes called the "cunning of nature": what Kant described here was to be realized precisely through the cunning of nature. At the end of the nineteenth century, the age of imperialism was dominated by Hegelian-style thought; the struggle for hegemony among the great powers was interpreted as signifying a struggle to become the world-historical state. The result was the First World War. On the other hand, together with the rise of imperialism, the end of the nineteenth century also saw a revival of Kant's theory of a federation of nations. This was actually realized to a limited extent with the establishment of the League of Nations after the First World War. This came about as an expression not so much of Kantian ideals as of what he called humanity's unsociable sociability, demonstrated on an unprecedented scale in the First World War.

The League of Nations remained ineffective due to the failure of the United States, its original sponsor, to ratify its charter, and it was ultimately unable to prevent the Second World War. But that war resulted in the

creation of the United Nations. In other words, Kant's proposal was realized through two world wars—through, that is, the cunning of nature. The United Nations was established after the Second World War with due reflection on the failings of the League of Nations, yet the United Nations also remained ineffective. The United Nations has been criticized as being nothing more than a means by which powerful states pursue their own ends; since it lacks an independent military, it has no choice but to rely on powerful states and their militaries. Criticisms of the United Nations always come back in the end to Hegel's criticism of Kant: the attempt to resolve international disputes through the United Nations is dismissed as Kantian idealism. Of course, the United Nations really is weak—but if we simply jeer at it and dismiss it, what will the result be? Another world war. And this will in turn result in the formation of yet another international federation. Kant's thought conceals a realism much crueler than even Hegel's.

A federation of nations is unable to suppress conflicts or wars between states, because it will not grant recognition to a state capable of mobilizing sufficient force. But according to Kant, the wars that will arise as a result will only strengthen the federation. The suppression of war will come about not because one state has surpassed all others to become hegemonic. Only a federation of nations established as a result of wars can accomplish this. On this point, the thought of Sigmund Freud in his later years is suggestive. The early Freud sought the superego in prohibitions "from above" issued by parent or society, but after he encountered cases of combat fatigue and war neurosis in the First World War, he revised his position. He now saw the superego as externally directed aggressiveness redirected inward toward the self. For example, those raised by easygoing parents often become the bearers of a strong sense of morality. What Kant called humanity's unsociable sociability is similar to what Freud called aggressiveness. Seen in this way, we can understand how outbursts of aggressiveness can transform into a force for restraining aggression.[16]

This discussion of Kant and Hegel may sound dated, but in fact it directly touches on present-day actualities. We see this, for example, in the conflict between unilateralism and multilateralism surrounding the 2003 Iraq War, a conflict between the United States, acting independently of the United Nations, and Europe, which stressed the need to act with UN authorization. In the midst of this, Robert Kagan, a representative intellectual of the neoconservative school, argued that whereas the United States with its military might was grounded in a Hobbesian worldview of a war of all

against all, the militarily inferior Europe stressed economic power and nonmilitary means (soft power), basing itself on Kant's worldview and the pursuit of the ideal of perpetual peace. But according to Kagan, the state of perpetual peace à la Kant that Europe desired could only be realized after security had been achieved through military force (hard power) based on the Hobbesian worldview of the United States.[17]

But the theoretical grounding of U.S. unilateralism comes less from Hobbes than Hegel: its advocates believed that the war would lead to the realization of a world-historical idea. That Idea was liberal democracy, according to the neoconservative ideologue Francis Fukuyama, who in fact quoted Hegel directly. To argue that the United States took a unilateralist line only because it was pursuing its own interests and hegemony does not change matters: under Hegelian logic, it is America's pursuit of its own particular will that will finally lead to the realization of the universal Idea. This is precisely what Hegel called the cunning of reason. In that sense, the United States is the world-historical state.

By contrast, Negri and Hardt describe this conflict in the following terms: "Most of the contemporary discussions about geopolitics pose a choice between two strategies for maintaining global order: unilateralism or multilateralism."[18] Here unilateralism means the position of the United States, which "began to redefine the boundaries of the former enemy and organize a single network of control over the world."[19] Multilateralism refers to the position of the United Nations or of Europe, which criticized the United States. Negri and Hardt reject both positions: "The multitude will have to rise to the challenge and develop a new framework for the democratic constitution of the world."[20] They continue, "When the multitude is finally able to rule itself, democracy becomes possible."[21]

If Europe's position was Kantian and America's Hegelian, then Negri and Hardt's position would have to be called Marxist (albeit, that of the 1848 Marx). Their position that because the various states represent the self-alienation of the multitude, they will be abolished when the multitude is able to rule itself clearly derives from the early Marx—more precisely, from the anarchism of Proudhon. In this light, their "new framework for the democratic constitution of the world" is akin to the International Workingmen's Association (the First International), jointly formed by the Proudhon and Marx factions. But Negri and Hardt never consider why simultaneous world revolutions since the nineteenth century have all ended in failure.

We have seen how the historical situation that has emerged since 1990 has involved a repetition of the classical philosophy of Kant, Hegel, and

Marx. Accordingly, to rethink these figures is to touch on problems integral to the reality of today's world. But we have to reject the common view that believes that Kant was superseded by Hegel, and Hegel in turn by Marx. We need instead to reread Kant from the perspective of understanding how local communes and countermovements against capital and the state can avoid splintering and falling into mutual conflict. A federation of nations: this is where Kant saw the possibility for "a new framework for the democratic constitution of the world."

The Gift and Perpetual Peace

Kant located the way to perpetual peace not in a world state but in a federation of nations. This means that Kant rejected Hobbes's view, which sought to create a state of peace through a transcendent, Leviathan-like power. This is not how Kant is generally understood though—he has been criticized, for example, on the grounds that a powerful world state could emerge out of this federation of nations. The origins of this lie in Kant's failure to clearly demonstrate the possibility of creating peace without relying on Hobbesian principles. Accordingly, our task here is to clarify this from the perspective of modes of exchange.

According to Hobbes, a state of peace was established through a covenant with the sovereign "extorted by fear"—in other words, through mode of exchange B. What was Kant's position? In "Toward a Perpetual Peace," for example, Kant sees the development of commerce as a condition for peace: the development of dense relations of trade between states will render war impossible. This is partially true. But mode of exchange C is dependent on state regulation—in other words, on mode of exchange B. For this reason, mode C can never bring about the complete abolition of mode of exchange B. In reality, the development of mode of exchange C—that is, the development of industrial capitalism—gave rise to a new kind of conflict and war, of a different nature than those that had previously existed: the imperialistic world war.

At present, war between the developed countries is generally avoided, probably for the reasons that Kant spelled out. Yet a crisis situation involving deep hostility and warfare still exists between the developed countries and the developing countries economically subordinated to the developed countries and the late-developing countries now in a position to compete with the developed countries—in other words, between North and South. Even as this takes the guise of a religious conflict, it is fundamentally eco-

nomic and political in nature. This antagonism cannot be subdued through military pressure. A true resolution of this hostility is only possible through the elimination of economic disparities between states—and of the capitalist formation that reproduces such disparities.

Any number of efforts have been made to eliminate economic disparities between countries. For example, advanced countries provide economic aid to developing countries. This is regarded as a kind of redistributive justice. But in reality, this aid serves to generate further accumulation of capital in the advanced countries. In this, the aid resembles the case of domestic social-welfare policies within those countries: in both cases, redistribution simply functions as another link in the process of capitalist accumulation. Far from eliminating inequality, redistributive justice actually proliferates inequality. It also has the result of legitimating and strengthening the state power responsible for carrying out this redistribution. Ultimately, it perpetuates the state of war between North and South.

In his last major work, *The Law of Peoples*, John Rawls locates justice between states in the realization of economic equality. He describes this as a self-critical development of the notion of justice in a single country that he had written about in such earlier essays as "Justice as Fairness." Yet Rawls here continues to consider justice only in terms of redistributive justice. For that reason, just as distributive justice within a single country always ends up in a kind of welfare-state capitalism, distributive justice between states requires a push to strengthen the entities that would carry out redistribution. In the end, this means redistribution carried out by economically powerful countries, meaning in practice either world empire or imperialism.

Kant's justice, however, was not distributive justice: it was justice based in exchange. It did not mean the amelioration of economic disparity through redistribution; it was to be realized through the abolition of the system of exchange that gave birth to those disparities in the first place. Of course, it had to exist not only domestically within countries but also between nations as well. In sum, Kant's justice could only be achieved through a new world system. How could this be realized? So long as we think of power only in terms of military or economic power, we will end up taking the same road as Hobbes.

There is an important hint to be had from the example of the tribal confederations that existed before the rise of the state. Confederations of tribes were headed by neither a king nor an all-powerful chief. Previously, I discussed these "societies against the state." Here, though, I would like to

reconsider them for what they might tell us about how to overcome the state of war between nations without resorting to a sovereign that stands above the various states. Tribal confederations were sustained by mode of exchange A—by the principle of reciprocity. They were sustained, in other words, not by military or economic power but by the power of the gift. This likewise served as the guarantor of the equality and mutual autonomy of the member tribes.

A federation of nations in the sense that Kant intended is of course different from a tribal confederation. The base for the former lies in a world-economy developed on a global scale—on, that is, the generalization of mode of exchange C. A federation of nations represents the restoration of mode of exchange A on top of this. We have up until now thought about this primarily at the level of a single country. But as I have repeatedly stressed, this cannot be realized within a single country. It can only be realized at the level of relations between states—in other words, through the creation of a new world system. This would be something that goes beyond the previously existing world systems—the world-empire or the world-economy (the modern world system). It can only be a world republic. It marks the return of the mini-world system in a higher dimension.

We have already looked at the return in a higher dimension of the principle of reciprocity in terms of consumer-producer cooperatives. Now we need to consider this in terms of relations between states. The only principle that can ground the establishment of a federation of nations as a new world system is the reciprocity of the gift. Any resemblance between this and today's overseas aid is only apparent. For example, what would be given under this are not products but the technical knowledge (intellectual property) needed to carry out production. Voluntary disarmament to abolish weapons that pose a threat to others would be another kind of gift here. These kinds of gifts would undermine the real bases of both capital and state in the developed countries.

We should not assume that this would lead to disorder. The gift operates as a power stronger than even military or economic power. The universal rule of law is sustained not by violence but by the power of the gift. The world republic will be established in this way. Those who would dismiss this as a kind of unrealistic dream are the ones who are being foolish. Even Carl Schmitt, a consistent advocate of the most severe form of a Hobbesian worldview, saw the sole possibility for the extinction of the state in the spread of consumer-producer cooperatives:

> Were a world state to embrace the entire globe and humanity, then it would be no political entity and could only loosely be called a state. If, in fact, all humanity and the entire world were to become a unified entity . . . [and should] that interest group also want to become cultural, ideological, or otherwise more ambitious, and yet remain strictly nonpolitical, then it would be a neutral consumer or producer co-operative moving between the poles of ethics and economics. It would know neither state nor kingdom nor empire, neither republic nor monarchy, neither aristocracy nor democracy, neither protection nor obedience, and would altogether lose its political character.[22]

What Schmitt here calls a world state is identical to what Kant called a world republic. In Schmitt's thinking, if we follow Hobbes's view, the abolition of the state is impossible. This does not mean, however, that the state cannot be abolished. It suggests rather that it is possible only through a principle of exchange different from that which formed the basis of Hobbes's understanding.

The Federation of Nations as World System

Just as Kant predicted, the United Nations was born as the result of two world wars. But today's United Nations is far from being a new world system; it is merely a venue where states vie for hegemony. Yet the United Nations is also a system established on the basis of enormous human sacrifice. For all its inadequacies, the future of the human species is unthinkable without it.

Most criticism aimed at the United Nations relates to the Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. But today's United Nations is not limited to these entities. It is in fact an enormous, complex federation that might best be called the UN system. Its activities cover three primary domains: (1) military affairs, (2) economic affairs, and (3) medical, cultural, and environmental issues. Unlike the first two domains, the third domain has many historical precedents that date back to before the League of Nations or United Nations.

For example, the World Health Organization is an international organization that began in the nineteenth century that has linked up with the United Nations. In other words, leaving aside the first and second domains, the UN system was not deliberately planned; it instead took shape

as entities that initially arose as separate international associations and then later merged with the United Nations. These will continue to appear with the expansion of world intercourse. Moreover, in the third domain, there is no rigid distinction between national (state-based) and non-national entities. As can be seen, for example, in the way NGOs participate as delegates alongside nations at world environmental meetings, these already transcend the nation. In that sense, the UN system is already something more than a simple united nations.

The situation is different in the first and second domains, because they are closely related to the state and capital. They have a determinative impact on today's United Nations. In other words, modes of exchange B and C continue to determine today's United Nations. If the same sort of characteristics found in the third domain were to be realized in the first and second domains, we would in effect have a new world system. But this will not simply happen as a kind of natural outgrowth of the expansion of world intercourse: it will no doubt face resistance from the state and capital.

Transforming the United Nations into a new world system will require a countermovement against the state and capital arising in each country. Only changes at the level of individual countries can lead to a transformation of the United Nations. At the same time, the opposite is also true: only a reform of the United Nations can make possible an effective union of national countermovements around the world. Countermovements based in individual countries are always in danger of being fragmented by the state and capital. There is no reason to expect that they will somehow naturally link together across national borders, that a simultaneous world revolution will somehow spontaneously be generated. Even if a global alliance (a new International) is created, it will not have the power to counter the various states; there is, after all, no reason to expect that what hitherto has been impossible will become possible to achieve.

Usually, a simultaneous world revolution is narrated through the image of simultaneous uprisings carried out by local national resistance movements in their own home countries. But this could never happen, nor is it necessary. Suppose, for example, one country has a revolution that ends with the country making a gift of its military sovereignty to the United Nations. This would of course be a revolution in a single nation.[23] But it wouldn't necessarily result in external interference or international isolation. No weapon can resist the power of the gift. It has the power to attract the support of many states and to fundamentally change the structure of

the United Nations. For these reasons, such a revolution in one country could in fact lead to simultaneous world revolution.

This kind of revolution may seem an unrealistic possibility. But without a global movement for such a revolution, we are almost certainly headed for world war. In fact, that still remains the likeliest outcome. But this doesn't demand pessimism: as Kant believed, a world war will only lead to the implementation of a more effective federation of nations. This will not happen automatically, however: it will only come about if there are local countermovements against the state and capital in all the countries of the world.

The realization of a world system grounded in the principle of reciprocity—a world republic—will not be easy. Modes of exchange A, B, and C will remain stubborn presences. In other words, the nation, state, and capital will all persist. No matter how highly developed the forces of production (the relation of humans and nature) become, it will be impossible to completely eliminate the forms of existence produced by these modes of exchange—in other words, by relations between humans.[24] Yet so long as they exist, so too will mode of exchange D. No matter how it is denied or repressed, it will always return. That is the very nature of what Kant called a regulative Idea.